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Abstract: This paper critically reviews Philip Kitcher’s most recent epistemology of 
science, real realism. I argue that this view is unstable under different understandings of 
the term “representation”, and that the arguments offered for the position are either 
unsound or invalid depending on the understanding employed. Suitably modified those 
arguments are however convincing in favor of a deflationary version of real realism, 
which I refer to as the bare view. The bare view accepts Kitcher’s Galilean strategy, and 
the ensuing commitment to the existence of unobservables; but it does not trade on a 
correspondence or copy theory of representation. So the bare view, unlike real realism, 
does not entail that our representations match reality even approximately.  
 
 
1. Models and Realism 
 
“Scientific models” is an old topic in the philosophy of science. Duhem and Poincaré 
both discussed models extensively and acknowledged, with some degree of disaffection, 
their prominent role in science (Duhem, 1914/54; Poincaré, 1908, esp. Book I; Poincaré, 
1935). Although the logical positivists were on the whole critical of the use of models 
(e.g. Carnap, 1966, esp. Part V) – the topic resurfaced in the contemporaneous well-
known work of Norman Campbell (Campbell, 1920, part I). It achieved its heyday 
probably in the late 1960’s, in the wake of Mary Hesse’s consummate and masterly 
work on analogy (Hesse, 1966). Later, in the writings of the proponents of the semantic 
conception, it became assimilated to the different topic of understanding the structure of 
theoretical knowledge, and consequently the 1970’s and 1980’s saw the focus of 
                                                 
1 Forthcoming in W. González (Ed.), Scientific Realism and Democratic Society: The Philosophy of 
Philip Kitcher, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Amsterdam: 
Rodopi. 
2 The first version was delivered at the Ferrol conference in honor of Philip Kitcher in February 2006. The 
final version was submitted during my stay as visiting scholar at Harvard University, in September 2009, 
and I want to thank the Philosophy Department, in particular Hilary Putnam, for sponsorship. Financial 
help is acknowledged from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education (research projects HUM2005-
01787-C03-01, FFI2008-06418-C03-01 and PR2008-0079). 
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philosophical attention move somewhere else – namely, towards the epistemology and 
structure of scientific theories. (Suppe, 1974).  
 
However, models have recently emancipated themselves again, and philosophers of 
science have returned to their study with renewed energy (Morgan and Morrison, 1999), 
(Magnani et al., 1999), (Jones and Cartwright, 2005). The focus of the scholarship of 
the last decade is both distinct and original. The logical positivists and their successors 
in the semantic tradition focused on the abstract nature and structure of models, while 
recent philosophical attention has shifted towards the function and role of models in 
scientific practice. In other words, rather than focusing on “models” – as isolated 
entities – the recent philosophical scholarship has focused on “modelling” – the activity 
of building and applying models. Thus recent work on models emphasises the different 
ways in which models belong in the context of their use; and in particular it stresses the 
ways in which the functions of models relate to the purposes of the agents that use them. 
The autonomy of such purposes from the aims of theorising and data-collection thus 
reveals hitherto unsuspected levels of autonomy of models both from high-level theory 
and data. 
 
In more recent years some of the attention has focused even more narrowly upon to the 
notion of scientific representation. 3 Representing is one of the central purposes of 
modelling, so it is not surprising that as the modelling literature is turning away from 
considering the nature and structure of abstract models and towards their practical use in 
the activity of modelling, so is the representation literature slowly moving away from 
the abstract nature of the representational relation and towards the practice of 
representing. 4My contribution to this movement has been to expound and develop a 
new conception of representation – the inferential conception – which I see as 
essentially embedded in the pragmatist tradition while respectful of some central realist 
intuitions. 
 
My purpose in this paper is to show that this ongoing debate on scientific representation 
has implications for Philip Kitcher’s epistemological writings on science, in particular 
                                                 
3 For some examples see the papers delivered at the 2002 PSA symposium on the pragmatics of scientific 
representation, particularly Giere, R. (2004), Van Fraassen, B. (2004) and my own Suárez, M. (2004).  
4 For a conspicuous example see Van Fraassen (2008).  
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for the position (real realism) that he has defended in his recent and brilliant article in 
The Philosophical Review (Kitcher, 2001). In particular the aim is to analyse Kitcher’s 
epistemological work through the lens of the recent debate on representation, testing the 
strength of his theses against the background of the different conceptions of 
representation available. My claim is that doing so illuminates the actual reach and 
content of Kitcher’s position. In particular I shall argue that Kitcher’s arguments for real 
realism are valid but only under the right interpretation of representation; and under this 
interpretation they are not arguments for any kind of scientific realism worth its name.  
 
In the range of positions in the realism-antirealism debate, Kitcher’s own estimate is 
that his real realism lies somewhere between the quietism of Arthur Fine’s Natural 
Ontological Attitude – which I favour – and the more radical metaphysical anti-realism 
of Hilary Putnam’s badly misnamed “internal realism”. I shall argue that once the right 
conception of representation is identified and applied coherently, these arguments in 
fact provide further ammunition in favour of a quietist position in the epistemology of 
science. This is a view that abstains from the realism debate altogether – as long as 
practiced in the abstract arena of philosophical meta-reflection on the nature of science 
as a whole, as opposed to attending case by case to the details of the science. Thus my 
conclusion will combine a degree of scepticism with a dose of enthusiasm. I shall 
remain sceptical that a realist perspective on science is thereby forced upon us, while 
enthusiastic about the force of some of Kitcher’s arguments (the “Galilean strategy” in 
particular) – as long as they are understood as arguments in favour of a quietist position 
concerning the philosophical meta-debates, a position most closely associated in the 
scientific epistemology literature with NOA (Fine, 1986, chapter 7). 
 
 
2. Realism, Empiricism, and Kitcher’s Galilean Strategy 
 
2.1. Scientific Realism 
 
As I shall argue, Kitcher’s characterisation of realism is subtle, multifaceted, and 
intricate. However, I shall also argue that the intended characterisation adds nothing 
essential to Van Fraassen’s famous description of the position: “science aims to give us, 
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in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a 
scientific theory involves the belief that it is true”. (Van Fraassen, 1980, p. 8). 
 
In my view this remains an acceptably accurate characterisation of the position, 
emphasising all the suitable normative (or methodological), semantic, metaphysical and 
epistemic dimensions of scientific realism. 5 Let us refer to each of these dimensions as 
the normative, semantic, metaphysical and epistemic commitments of scientific realism. 
The normative commitment is implicit in the definition of the aim of science, which 
articulates a regulative ideal for science fit for realism – an aim that will typically go 
well beyond the concrete objectives and aims of any particular scientific research 
project. This commitment makes it clear that realism lies in the contrast class to 
Feyerabend’s methodological “anything goes” anarchism, and various other forms of 
normative instrumentalism.  
 
The semantic commitment is expressed by the requirement to interpret theories literally 
(a commitment shared by some antirealisms, such as Van Fraassen’s own constructive 
empiricist alternative to realism). A theory provides a literally true story of the world if 
and only if “the language of the theory cannot be reinterpreted in non-theoretical terms 
without some change in meaning”. 6 This commitment brings out in full force scientific 
realism’s rejection of a verification-based criterion for the meaning of theoretical terms. 
Scientific realism is thus shown to be appropriately in opposition to semantic 
antirealisms such as Carnap’s verificationism, pragmatist theories of truth à la James, 
and Dummett’s semantic antirealism.  
 
A minimal metaphysical commitment is expressed by the phrase “what the world is 
like”, which implicitly states the independence thesis, 7 at least with respect to our 
theorising, if not with respect to our minds and the full range of our mental states. So 
this turn of phrase distinguishes scientific realism appropriately from any radical form 
of idealism or constructivism that would deny that the contents of the world are 
dependent upon our theorising. 
                                                 
5 Kitcher disagrees (Kitcher 1993, p. 150), but his reasons there do not seem to matter to the arguments 
presented in his most recent work, and my response to them herein. 
6 Wikepedia’s neat entry on constructive empiricism! 
7 The thesis that there is an external world independent of our concepts and our beliefs – see Wright 
(1992, pp. 2-3). 
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Finally, the statement that the acceptance of theories involves the belief in their truth 
suitably expresses, in my view, the very minimal epistemic commitment of any realism 
worth its name. It is minimal in the suitable sense that it does not require any realist to 
accept (and hence believe in) all successful theories, it merely states the kind and degree 
of epistemic commitment that according to realism is implicit in any act of acceptance. 
In this way it is possible to distinguish appropriately scientific realism from 
epistemological views that do not require belief in the theory’s truth for an appropriate 
interpretation of scientific practice and theory-acceptance, including certain varieties of 
pragmatism, such as Dewey’s original “instrumentalism”, and of course Van Fraassen’s 
own antirealist alternative, namely “constructive empiricism”. 
 
No doubt the characterisation so sketched informs a particular interpretation of science 
and scientific activity. It does not need to correspond to any attitude found explicitly or 
implicitly in the scientific agents themselves. Nor does it need to form an articulate set 
of doctrines, but might just express an attitudinal commitment to such an interpretation 
of science (Van Fraassen, 2002). It is nonetheless sufficiently precise, in my view, as a 
characterisation of some minimal commitments of scientific realism, and it is thus worth 
fighting for or against it (depending on taste or inclination).  
 
In the remainder of this section I shall argue that for the purposes of this essay Kitcher’s 
intended characterisation of real realism does not improve on Van Fraassen’s. Kitcher 
characterises real realism negatively by describing in painstaking detail its alternatives. 
These alternatives appear grouped in four broad positions, namely: semantic 
empiricism, epistemological empiricism, semantic constructivism and epistemological 
constructivism. Each of the next four subsections is devoted to showing that each of 
these antirealist positions in one way or another denies some of the commitments of 
scientific realism as characterised by Van Fraassen. Thus, I will conclude, Kitcher’s 
purposes are well served by Van Fraassen’s characterisation – since realism as 
characterised by Van Fraassen is in agreement with real realism as Kitcher intends it. 
Two of these antirealisms will deserve detailed discussion, but let us here at least sketch 
each of them in turn. 
 
2.2. Semantic empiricism 
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Kitcher characterises semantic empiricism as the conjunction of four theses (Kitcher, 
ibid. p. 161). (SE1): Our basic terms only receive meaning through our application of 
them to observable things, properties, and events. (SE2): Any nonbasic terms we use 
must be introduced using terms that are ultimately reducible to basic terms. (SE3): Any 
term that is reducible to basic terms applies only to observables. (SE4): The only 
meaningful language we can use applies to observables.  
 
These four theses provide a generalisation of the verificationist criterion of meaning. 
And since the language of science is complete with putative references to unobservable 
entities, it follows that – if it is to make sense – it must be reinterpreted in terms of the 
only meaningful kind of language, namely the one that applies to observables. But this 
is another way of saying that theories, if they are to make sense, can not be interpreted 
literally, since it is explicitly a denial that “the language of the theory cannot be 
reinterpreted in non-theoretical terms without some change in meaning”. In other words 
semantic empiricism is characterised by its denial that theories provide us with literally 
true stories about the world, and hence entails a denial of scientific realism in Van 
Fraassen’s definition. Kitcher’s formulation of semantic empiricism as the conjunction 
of these four theses (SE1-4) does not differ from Van Fraassen’s characterisation. Its 
power and interest instead lies in the fact that Kitcher is filling much detail and structure 
into Van Fraassen’s sketchy definition, by providing us with four distinct conditions 
that are part of the semantic commitment of scientific realism. 
 
2.3. Epistemological empiricism 
 
Kitcher describes epistemological empiricism as the combination of six different theses: 
(EEA1): The only claims we can directly justify are those about observables. (EEA2): 
We can only check a putative method of justification by showing that it tends to lead to 
correct conclusions. (EEA3): Thus we can only check methods of justification that lead 
to conclusions whose truth values can be directly ascertained just by investigating 
observables. (EEA4): Therefore we have no basis for trusting putative methods of 
justification that lead to conclusions whose truth values cannot be directly ascertained 
just by investigating observables. (EEA5): The truth values of statements that assert the 
existence of unboservables and that attribute properties to unobservables (for short: 
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statements about unobservables) cannot be directly ascertained just by investigating 
observables. (EEA6): Thus, we should remain agnostic about conclusions about 
unobservables.  
 
Epistemological empiricism is a main kind of antirealism to which I shall return later in 
the paper. For now I would just like to note that it too marks out a form of antirealism in 
Van Fraassen’s sense. The proof is trivial since Van Fraassen’s own constructive 
empiricism is a form of epistemological empiricism that rejects inference to the best 
explanation methods when applied to yield conclusions about the unobservable domain. 
More specifically, epistemological empiricism (EEA6) advices us to remain agnostic 
about whatever our favoured theories say about the unobservable domain. It follows that 
according to this view theory acceptance can not entail belief in the truth of our theories 
simpliciter – since this view rejects the need to believe in the truth of what our theories 
say about the unobservable domain. 
 
2.4. Semantic Constructivism 
 
This position is involved and contains eight separate theses that Kitcher denotes as 
(SC1-8), 8 and which I will not describe here in detail since this kind of antirealism is 
not directly relevant to the present discussion. For our purposes only (SC1), (SC2), and 
(SC8) are relevant. (SC1) states that scientific realism must take it that our terms refer 
to entities that are independent of us and our cognition. (SC2) then asserts that if our 
terms are to refer as (SC1) claims, then there must be a relation between linguistic (or 
mental) items and constituents of the mind-independent reality. In other words the 
referential relations link up our terms with the external world. The remaining theses 
(SC3-SC7) furnish an antirealist argument against the coherence of such referential 
relations, which allows the semantic constructivist to derive their main conclusion, 
namely (SC8). According to (SC8) there is no way to establish the connection between 
our terms and reality, and the realist view of mind-independent objects and of our 
relation to them is unintelligible.  
 
                                                 
8 Kitcher, ibid, p. 162. Semantic constructivism is meant to capture subtle forms of anti-realism such as 
Nelson Goodman’s constructivist nominalism (Goodman 1978), and Hilary Putnam’s “internal realism” 
(Putnam 1981); I agree with Kitcher that the latter ought to turn up as a version of anti-realism on any 
appropriate characterization of scientific realism in general. 
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Semantic constructivism provides us with a mosaic of different ways to deny the 
commitments expressed in Van Fraassen’s definition of scientific realism. In particular 
semantic constructivism denies that the aim of science is regulative in the sense required 
by the realist, since on this view the realist conception of truth turns out to be an 
incoherent aim for science (and hence impossible as its regulative goal). On a slightly 
different reading semantic constructivism trivialises the truth component required for 
the acceptance of theories. For theories that have been developed in proper accordance 
with the scientific method cannot fail to be true in the only sense of “true” that is 
coherent, namely the pragmatist-inspired criterion of convergence in the limit of proper 
inquiry. So our acceptance of theories cannot fail to require us to fully believe in them if 
they have been constructed in proper obedience to the rules of the scientific method. 9  
 
2.5. Epistemological Constructivism 
 
Kitcher defines epistemological constructivism as encompassing the following five 
theses. (EC1): All our experience of nature is mediated by our concepts. (EC2): Thus 
there is no way to check directly which aspects of objects belong to objects 
independently of our conceptualisation of them. (EC3): The only way of trying to check 
indirectly is to rely on the success of our representations in terms of the internal 
coherence of our experience. (EC4): We have no reason to believe that this kind of 
success is indicative of accurate representation of the properties of objects 
independently of our conceptualisation. (EC5) Any belief that our representations 
accurately identify the properties of mind independent objects is unjustified.  
 
Epistemological constructivism aims at capturing forms of coherentism typical of some 
social constructivist thought, such as the Edinburgh and Bath schools, and possibly 
Latour’s actor-network theory. It clashes with scientific realism as characterised by Van 
Fraassen at several simultaneous levels. First, the epistemological constructivist denies 
that science can possibly aim at truth in any sense of the term acceptable to the scientific 
realist, as correspondence to the world. Second, the acceptance of scientific theories is 
compatible with full belief in their truth as long as truth is understood as a matter of 
                                                 
9 And indeed this reading of semantic constructivism gets it into line with Putnam’s internal realism – a 
very subtle and intricate position indeed, which is not even clear is genuinely stable. For critical 
discussion see e.g. Van Fraassen (1997) and Frisch (1999).    
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coherence with the rest of our beliefs – but then this is not much of an achievement 
from a realist point of view, since it requires a coherence account of truth, which is 
unacceptable for the realist. And third, possibly, the assumption of a ready made world 
standing out there to be literally or otherwise described by our theories is compromised 
if not by denial, at least by a sort of agnostic omission – it becomes a totally idle and 
redundant presupposition of inquiry.   
 
To sum up, I have argued that Kitcher’s alternatives to realism (semantic and 
epistemological empiricism, semantic and epistemological constructivism) are all 
appropriately and explicitly in the contrast class of Van Fraassen’s definition of 
scientific realism. Kitcher’s characterisations are subtle and informative, since they add 
plenty of detail to the alternatives to scientific realism, and hence help to draw a 
panoramic yet intricate view of its multiple commitments. However, the position that 
results out of this procedure (realism and its subspecies, real realism) does not differ 
significantly from the more sketchily one characterised by Van Fraassen – the former is 
at worse a particular case of the latter, if not coincidental. This thus justifies the use of 
Van Fraassen’s definition, no matter how sketchy, in the remainder of this essay. 
 
 
3. The Representational Assumption 
 
I now turn my attention to Kitcher’s own specific brand of scientific realism, what he 
calls real realism: “We thus envisage a world of entities independent not just of each 
but of all of us, a world that we represent more or less accurately, and we suppose that 
what we identify as our successes signal the approximate correctness of some of our 
representations” (Kitcher, ibid, p. 155). Real realism is intended to be a particular form 
of denial of the four antirealist views described in the previous section, and hence it is 
intended to lie within the logical space of scientific realism as characterised by Van 
Fraassen. However, it is significant that the notion of representation, which is 
conspicuously absent in Van Fraassen’s characterisation, should be so prominent in 
Kitcher’s definition. I will argue that there are more or less realist-leaning 
interpretations of the term “representation”, and that real realism is not invariant under 
changes of interpretation. That is, unlike the more general Van Fraassen-inspired 
version of scientific realism, real realism is unstable under different readings of the term 
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“representation” that appear in its definition. Under some interpretations of the term 
“representation” real realism indeed turns into a subspecies of scientific realism, and it 
has an empty intersection with each of the four antirealisms described by Kitcher. But 
under a sufficiently deflationary interpretation of representation, I will argue, the 
position that results is not a subspecies of Van Fraassen’s scientific realism, and 
contrary to Kitcher’s intention, its intersection with at least some of the antirealisms is 
not the empty set. 
 
Kitcher’s argument is intricate and sophisticated; he develops his view through a 
detailed explanation of three assumptions: Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude 
(NOA) towards science’s existential commitments, an analogous assumption regarding 
our epistemic stance that Kitcher calls the natural epistemological attitude (NEA), and a 
third assumption that Kitcher brands the Galilean strategy. Kitcher contends that the 
first two assumptions are built into even the most ordinary instances of everyday 
cognition from infancy: they are a presupposition of everyday cognition. The third (the 
Galilean strategy) is the bit added by modern science to allow us to cognitively move 
from the level of ordinary (observed or at least observable) objects and their properties 
to the level of the unobserved or even unobservable objects and their properties 
postulated by science, whenever these can be detected through the aid of modern 
instrumentation. This is the assumption that Galileo inaugurated with the use of his 
telescope and it would indeed be hard to comprehend most of present-day science 
without it. The conjunction of these three assumptions is intended by Kitcher to yield 
real realism.  
 
NOA is notoriously (meant to be) neutral between realism and antirealism since it is 
supposed to describe just the core assumptions that they share. Kitcher argues plausibly 
that the Galilean strategy must be accepted by anyone committed to modern science, 
regardless of their position in the realism / antirealism debate. The claim is then that this 
shows that real realism is grounded upon ordinary cognitive assumptions that are in no 
way contentious in the epistemological debate. Hence real realism must be rationally 
accepted by all participants, whatever their initial intuitions in epistemology. However, 
it is important to stress that for this argument to work, all three assumptions must be 
shown to be shared by all the participants in the debate, regardless of any additional 
views. Indeed Kitcher claims this status for NEA as well, i.e. he claims that this 
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assumption too is neutral in the debate between realism and antirealism. But he does not 
articulate a defence of this claim beyond stating that it is a presupposition of everyday 
cognition of ordinary (observable) objects and their properties. I shall argue that 
whether or not this claim holds depends strongly on the conception of scientific 
representation adopted. 
 
In a scientific representation a source (such as a physical object, a diagram or an 
equation) stands for some target (a system, process, or state of a system). There is first a 
realist-friendly interpretation of the term “representation” according to which a theory 
or model represents if and only if it stands in the appropriate one-to-one relation with 
what it represents, providing a sort of “copy” or match for it. I will refer to such theories 
as “substantive reductive” theories since they aim to fully analyse the relation of 
representation down to some set of objective relations between objects and their 
properties, excluding the purposes of agents. In the next section I will provide a few 
different detailed renditions of this type of theory. For now it is enough to mention that 
under a substantive reductive interpretation of representation, real realism indeed 
coincides with the position sketched out by Van Fraassen. We would paraphrase real 
realism under this interpretation as follows: “We thus envisage a world of entities 
independent not just of each but of all of us, a world that we mirror or copy more or less 
accurately, and we suppose that what we identify as our successes signal the 
approximate correctness of some of our mirrors or copies”.  
 
This definition adds some detail to the metaphysical dimension of Van Fraassen’s 
characterisation of realism; while taking away the explicit normative commitment to the 
aims of science (which we can however take to be implicit). Conversely, a denial of real 
realism, always under a substantive reductive interpretation of the term 
“representation”, would entail the denial of scientific realism as characterised by Van 
Fraassen since it would entail denying either of the three dimensions of realism 
(metaphysical, semantic, epistemological) that are built into Van Fraassen’s 
characterisation. Hence, for instance, denying that what we “identify as our successes” 
signal “the approximate correctness of our representations” would entail a denial of Van 
Fraassen’s characterisation since it entails a denial of the epistemic dimension. 
 
 12
Thus real realism so characterised is indeed a position that can be fully classified as 
“realist”. Kitcher argues that it follows from the three aforementioned assumptions. I 
have already mentioned that I find his use of NOA and the Galilean strategy 
unimpeachable in this context. So let me turn to the third assumption, which Kitcher 
refers to as the Natural Epistemological Attitude (NEA), and which will turn out to be 
crucial to the evaluation of this argument. Kitcher states it as the assumption that “we 
are animals that form representations of the things around us; that is, the world 
sometimes puts human beings into states that bear content. Those states, in turn, guide 
our behaviour. In observing, or thinking about, other people, we take it for granted that 
their representational states sometimes adequately and accurately represent objects, 
facts and events that we can also identify” (Kitcher 2001, p. 154). This is the 
assumption that provides the representational content in real realism. Yet, as with real 
realism itself, this assumption has several readings, which yield very different 
commitments. I will argue that in line with the ambiguity in the term “representation”, 
NEA is ambiguous between a realist-friendly substantive reductive interpretation and a 
deflationary reading that has no realist connotations. On a substantive reductive reading, 
NEA could be paraphrased as follows: “we are animals that construct mirror images of 
the things around us; […] we take it for granted that […] representational states are 
sometimes adequate and accurate matches of objects, facts and events that we can also 
identify”. Let us refer to this realist-friendly version of NEA as NEA Realist or 
(NEAR). 
  
In conjunction with NOA and the Galilean strategy, NEAR is certainly capable of 
yielding the form of real realism that satisfies Van Fraassen’s characterisation, as I just 
pointed out. However, there are other interpretations of the term “representation” that 
provide us with different readings of NEA, and which do not give rise to any form of 
realism. In the next two sections I outline a few notions of representation available, and 
I analyse how the different readings of NEA fare with respect to them.  
 
 
4. Substantive Reductive Theories of Representation 
 
I have referred to the class of realist friendly theories of representation that are 
sometimes implicitly if not explicitly discussed in the literature as substantive reductive 
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(Suárez, 2009).  They are attempts to analyse the notion of representation down to some 
privileged kind of relations between the objects that function as source and target, and 
their natural properties. Two kinds of relations have been available in the literature for 
some time: similarity and isomorphism. Ronald Giere (1988, 1999a) and Aronson, 
Harré and Way (1993) have defended the importance of similarity for representation. 
Bas van Fraassen (1992, 1994) has focused on the virtues of isomorphism; and other 
writers in the structuralist tradition, including most prominently Brent Mundy (1986) 
have appealed to weakened versions of isomorphism. Elsewhere I have described these 
two theories as follows: 10 
 
The similarity conception of representation [sim]: A represents B if and only if A and B 
are similar. 
 
Note that [sim] is not strictly a resemblance theory: it does not assert that resemblance is 
a necessary and sufficient condition for representation. Similarity is a weaker condition, 
which neither requires nor includes similarities in visual appearance. It is typically 
assumed that something like an identity theory of similarity will hold: A and B are 
similar if and only if they share a subset of their properties. In accordance with this 
theory, similarity is reflexive (A is maximally similar to itself), and symmetric (if A is 
similar to B on account of sharing properties p1, p2, … pn, then B is similar to A on the 
same grounds); but non-transitive (A may share p1 with B, and B may share p2 with C, 
without A and C sharing any property – other than the property of sharing a property 
with B!). 
 
The isomorphism conception of representation [iso]: A represents B if and only if A and 
B instantiate isomorphic structures. 
 
Isomorphism is a mathematical relation between extensional structures. Hence the 
above definition presupposes that any two objects that stand in a representational 
relation exemplify isomorphic structures. The notion of structure-instantiation turns out 
to be ridden with difficulties; but the definition has the virtue that it makes sense of 
                                                 
10 Suárez (2003, pp. 225-244). Note that I am not claiming that the authors mentioned above have actually 
defended what I call substantive reductive theories about representation (although they are often taken to 
have done so) – only that they have provided the two paradigm kinds of relations that provide the basis 
for the reduction postulated in such theories. 
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object-to-object representation outside pure mathematics. The claim that two physical 
objects A and B are isomorphic is then short-hand for the claim that the extensional 
structures that A and B instantiate are isomorphic. In what follows “A” will 
indistinguishably denote the source and the structure that it instantiates, and “B” will 
denote the target and the structure that it instantiates. Isomorphism then demands that 
there be a one-to-one function that maps all the elements in the domain of one structure 
onto the elements in the other structure’s domain and vice-versa, while preserving the 
relations defined in each structure. Hence A and B must possess the same cardinality. 
More precisely, suppose that A = < D, Pnj> and B = < E, Tnj >; where D, E are the 
domains of objects in each structure and Pnj and Tnj are the n-place relations defined in 
the structure. A and B are isomorphic if and only if there is a one-to-one and onto 
mapping f: D? E, such that for any n-tuple (x1,…, xn) ∈ D:  Pnj [x1,…, xn] only if Tnj 
[f(x1),…, f(xn)]; and for any n-tuple (y1,…, yn) ∈ E: Tnj [y1,…, yn] only if Pnj [f-1(y1),…, 
f-1(yn)]. In other words, an isomorphism is a relation preserving mapping between the 
domains of two extensional structures, and its existence proves that the relational 
framework of the structures is the same. 
 
A theory of representation along the lines of [iso] and [sim] might well underwrite 
Kitcher’s argument for real realism, since when the term “representation” that appears 
in NEA is interpreted as these theories imply that it must be, we obtain the NEAR that 
actually yields real realism. However, it is possible to argue against these substantive 
reductive theories on the basis of five different arguments (what I call the variety, 
logical, misrepresentation, non-sufficiency and non-necessity arguments, respectively). 
These arguments show these theories to be untenable and I won’t rehearse them here – 
see (Suárez 2003) for the details. 
 
There are weakened versions of these theories, which I will neither describe here, and 
which do a little better in confronting the variety, logical, misrepresentation, non-
sufficiency and non-necessity arguments; and they might well do the job demanded in 
turning NEA into the NEAR required to yield – always in conjunction with NOA and 
the Galilean strategy – a kind of realism. But showing this in detail is besides the point 
for the purpose of this paper. The point I am making is that turning the conjunction 
(NEA & NOA & Galilean strategy) into an argument for real realism requires some 
prior realist-friendly interpretation of the notion of representation invoked in NEA. In 
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other words it requires that we replace the general formulation of NEA by a more 
concrete version that is friendly to realist intuitions, namely NEAR, since real realism 
only actually follows from the conjunction (NEAR & NOA & Galilean strategy). So I 
am not claiming that NEAR is incoherent – but then I do not need to. It is sufficient for 
my purposes to show that NEAR is an optional understanding of NEA: There are 
alternative interpretations that, unlike NEAR, carry no realist implications.   
 
 
5. An Inferential Conception of Representation 
 
The alternative non-realist account of scientific representation include the DDI account 
(Hughes 1997) and the inferential conception of representation (Suárez 2004). 11 
According to the latter, representation is not a dyadic relation between sources and 
targets but rather a combination of the scope of intended use and inferential capacities 
of the source as revealed in the practice and the context of representing. In other words 
we should focus more on the activity of representing than on the putative relation of 
representation. 12 And if we are to try to characterise the relation analytically then our 
best hope is the following definition:  
 
The inferential conception of representation [inf]: A represents B if and only if (i) the 
representational force of A points towards B, and (ii) A allows competent and informed 
agents to draw specific inferences regarding B. 
 
I explain the consequences and features of the conception elsewhere – for our purposes 
here it is enough to note that this is a deflationary and pragmatist conception of 
representation. It is also non-realist in the specific sense that its application to scientific 
representations does not require Van Fraassen’s strictures on scientific realism at all. 
This is the case for several reasons. Firstly, the inferential conception separates neatly 
between representation on the one hand and true, complete or empirically adequate 
representation on the other. A representational source licenses inferences regarding its 
target. The representation is true if it licenses no inferences to false conclusions about 
                                                 
11 I emphasize “non-realist” as opposed to “anti-realist”. My claim is that on the inferential conception 
representation turns out neutral with respect to the realism-antirealism debate. 
12 In nice agreement with the recent focus on practice in the modeling literature described in section 1. 
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the target; it is complete if it is true and fully informative, licensing inferences to all 
truths about the target; and it is empirically adequate if it is complete with respect to all 
the observable or measurable aspects of the target, licensing inferences to all the truths 
about those aspects. It is important to emphasize that “true”, “empirically adequate” and 
“complete” are not on this conception of representation equivalent to “mirror”: the 
source may be non-isomorphic and as dissimilar to the target as it could be, and still 
license true conclusions. 
 
Hence the goal of searching for representations of nature – even accurate ones – does 
not commit anyone to the kind of broad relation of mirroring characteristic of realism. 
And under this interpretation of the term “representation”, (NEA) takes a very different 
flavor, and must be paraphrased as follows: “we are animals that draw inferences 
regarding the things around us; that is, the world sometimes puts human beings into 
states that bear content. Those states, in turn, guide our behaviour. In observing, or 
thinking about, other people, we take it for granted that their inferences are sometimes 
adequate or accurate regarding objects, facts and events that we can also identify”. Let 
us refer to this statement, which is the non realist version of Kitcher’s NEA under a 
deflationary conception of representation, as (NEAN). NEAN entails no particular 
relation between the source and the target of a representation other than the source’s 
capacity (under the right interpretation, in the appropriate context of use, etc) to yield 
some conclusions about the target. 
 
This reading of NEA has one additional virtue; it squares nicely with Kitcher’s own 
emphasis that NEA “already plays a large role in our everyday lives, for instance in our 
guidance of children’s development” (Kitcher, ibid, p. 154). Indeed it is much easier to 
see the drawing of inferences playing such a role than the recognizing of either 
similarity or isomorphism. From that point of view NEAN looks not just a part of our 
ordinary cognition, but very much its starting point, as anyone acquainted with some 
early child psychology can testify. Surrogate inference by means of toy-objects is 
among the first cognitive activities performed by children in their encounter with the 
external world. It precedes any judgments of relevant similarities between objects, not 
to mention isomorphisms. It even seems to precede the development of language. 
Appreciation of similarity and isomorphism is a subtler form of pattern recognition that 
at best comes much later.  
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6. Kitcher’s Argument Deflated 
 
Here lies the rub for Kitcher’s argument. Once we distinguish carefully between two 
readings of NEA, a realist-leaning reading (NEAR) and a neutral, non-realist reading 
(NEAN), we can appreciate that real realism falls in between the gaps of the argument. 
Kitcher aims to show that NEA is so natural as to be unavoidable; it is one of those 
homely truths that belong to a common core of practices that neither realist nor 
antirealist can deny. He claims that NEA, when combined with NOA and the Galilean 
strategy – both equally undeniable – yields a robust enough form of realism. So, from 
the basic assumptions of ordinary cognition, a form of realism already reveals itself as 
correct; any non-realist alternative is thus just philosophical artifice.  
 
However, it turns out that the only reading of NEA that satisfies the first requirement 
(being undeniably unavoidable) is a deflationary one, along the lines for instance of the 
inferential conception. For it is NEAN that is undoubtedly part of our ordinary 
cognition and might be argued to be a basic part of children’s cognitive development 
from the start. But this is not the reading of NEA that yields realism in combination 
with NOA and the Galilean strategy. In order to satisfy the second requirement 
(yielding realism) we must read NEA in its realist-friendly version, NEAR. Hence we 
have unearthed a fallacy in Kitcher’s reasoning: the version of NEA that figures in the 
first part of the argument (and can thus be inferred from practice) is not the same 
version of NEA that figures in the second part of the argument (and thus leads to the 
assertion of real realism). We may summarize Kitcher’s argument in four succinct 
premises and a conclusion: 
 
Kitcher’s original argument for Real Realism 
 
1) NEA, the natural epistemic attitude, is undeniably the unreflective epistemic 
assumption of ordinary life. Since it is an uncontroversial part of ordinary and 
everyday cognition, it must be accepted by realists and antirealists alike. 
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2) NOA, the natural ontological attitude of trust in the existence of entities 
postulated by science, is the basic set of assumptions regarding scientific 
ontology that are shared between realism and antirealism. 
3) The Galilean strategy is the paradigm form of inference from the observable to 
the unobservable by means of modern scientific instrumentation. It is 
characteristic of modern science, and must be accepted by anyone committed to 
the rationality of the scientific enterprise as we know it. 
4) The conjunction of NEA, NOA and the Galilean strategy yields a basic form of 
scientific realism, namely real realism. 
 
Hence: 
 
5) Real realism must be accepted by anyone committed to the rationality of the 
scientific enterprise as we know it, regardless of further epistemic commitments.   
 
Let me now summarise what I believe to be wrong with this argument. There are two 
readings of NEA, depending on prior philosophical commitments regarding the notion 
of representation. Under an objective naturalist reading, NEA turns into NEAR, but 
under a suitably deflationary reading it turns into NEAN. Once NEA is seen to be 
ambiguous between these two possibilities, we can also see that the argument above is 
either unsound or invalid. For only NEAN makes the first premise (1) true, while only 
NEAR makes the fourth premise (4) true. Hence if we substitute NEAR in place of 
NEA throughout, the argument turns to be valid but unsound, since premise one is false. 
And if we substitute NEAN in place of NEA throughout the argument is again valid but 
unsound, since premise four is now false. So, in either case, real realism does not 
follow. If by contrast we substitute NEAN into the first premise (1) and NEAR into the 
fourth premise (4), we obtain a new version of the argument with true premises: 
 
 
Improved version of Kitcher’s argument for Real Realism: 
 
1’) NEAN is undeniably the unreflective epistemic assumption of ordinary life. 
Since it is an uncontroversial part of ordinary and everyday cognition, it must be 
accepted by realists and antirealists alike. 
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2) NOA is the basic set of assumptions regarding scientific ontology that are shared 
between realism and antirealism. 
 
3) The Galilean strategy must be accepted by anyone committed to the rationality of 
the scientific enterprise as we know it. 
 
4’) The conjunction of NEAR, NOA and the Galilean strategy yields a basic form of 
scientific realism, namely real realism. 
 
On any reading of NEA premises 2) and 3) seem reasonable. That is, Fine’s argument 
for NOA and Kitcher’s argument for the Galilean strategy are convincing whether 
NEAR or NEAN is correct. So the premises of the argument might all well be 
simultaneously true, and indeed we have been given good reasons to believe them all to 
be true. The problem is that the improved version of the argument above is invalid as an 
argument for the desired conclusion 5), because both premises 1) and 4) must be true of 
the same version of NEA in order to yield the conclusion. Hence the improved version 
of the argument containing only true premises cannot provide genuine rational 
ammunition in favour of real realism. 
 
 
7. The Bare View 
 
I have thus disputed Kitcher’s argument for real realism, but I have not provided any 
reasons of my own to doubt real realism. It may then be objected that I have not shown 
real realism to be incorrect, and have certainly not refuted it. However in this final 
section I would like to briefly point out that a different position is in fact vindicated by 
Kitcher’s argument. This is an epistemological quietism akin to the ontological quietism 
of NOA, and I claim that it should be particularly attractive from the point of view of 
pragmatism. 13 Hence in the debate on realism and antirealism as global descriptions of 
                                                 
13 And hence might nowadays result more attractive to Kitcher himself, given his recently-found 
enthusiasm for the pragmatist tradition, and Dewey in particular. His contribution to this volume, for 
instance, shows that Kitcher’s position is nowadays closer than ever to the pragmatism that is shared by 
NOA and the inferential conception of representation. The exception would seem to remain Kitcher’s 
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science, Kitcher’s argument might in the end provide plausibility considerations against 
adopting any realist commitment towards science, and in favour of a quietist attitude.  
 
In my view Kitcher provides or summarises good and convincing reasons to believe in 
the truth of premises 2), 3) and 4’). But all the reasons provided for premise 1) are only 
in fact good and convincing reasons for a different version, namely 1’). Since real 
realism does not follow from 1’), 2), 3) and 4’) Kitcher fails to provide good reasons for 
real realism full stop. The position which he provides good reasons for is instead the 
correspondingly minimal and deflationary version of real realism, which we can 
paraphrase as follows: “We thus envisage a world of entities about which we draw more 
or less accurate inferences, and we suppose that what we identify as our successes 
signal the appropriateness of some of our inferences”. Let us refer to the position 
expressed by means of this statement as the bare view, since it prima facie carries no 
epistemic implications. This view follows from 1’), 2), 3) and a suitably modified 
version of 4) namely, 4’’): ‘The conjunction of NEAN, NOA and the Galilean strategy 
yields the bare view’.  It is hard to see how the bare view could be denied by anyone, 
regardless of their epistemic persuasions. The realist will want to add further 
commitments relative to the realist relation of models to the world, while the antirealist 
will wish to add the sort of commitments described by Kitcher as semantic and 
epistemological empiricism and constructivism.   
 
So the bare view is neither realism nor antirealism; it is instead non-realism. It is a view 
that remains neutral as a description of scientific activity; and thus acceptable to all 
participants in the epistemic debate. It would seem to be perfectly acceptable to an 
instrumentalist of Dewey’s stripe – see e.g. Fine (2001, pp. 107-122). It is compatible, 
under the appropriate provisos, with Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism.14 It is also 
compatible with the definition of real realism that results from the inflated, realist-
leaning conception of representation that I described in section 2. In other words the 
bare view is a minimal commitment of all scientific epistemologies. But this is only to 
                                                                                                                                               
recalcitrant (and, I would argue, redundant) commitment to a correspondence theory of truth – see 
(Kitcher, 2002).  
14 The provisos are needed to account for the constructive empiricist’s denial of premise 3) in Kitcher’s 
argument – since the Galilean strategy in full generality applies to all types of modern instrumentation 
that allow inference from the observable to the unobservable domain, i.e. to microscopes as well as 
telescopes.  
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be expected since the bare view is entirely neutral in the debate between realism and 
antirealism – it can be, and must be, appropriated by both. 
 
 
8. Conclusions and Summary 
 
Let me summarise the view defended in this paper. In response to the different varieties 
of antirealism Kitcher defends a combination of three commitments – ontological, 
epistemic and methodological – that jointly entail a basic form of realism, real realism. 
The ontological commitment is the Natural Ontological Attitude, the methodological 
commitment is the Galilean strategy, while the epistemic commitment is Kitcher’s own 
Natural Epistemic Attitude (NEA). At the heart of NEA there is an primitive and 
unanalysed notion of representation (section 3). Yet, the recent literature on modelling 
suggests that the notion of representation itself is problematic, or ambiguous (sections 1 
and 2). There are both realist-leaning and deflationary conceptions of representation. I 
have presented two alternative “substantive reductive” theories of representation as 
exemplars of the more realist-leaning option (section 4); while presenting the details of 
the inferential conception that I defend as an example of a deflationary conception 
(section 5). The term “representation” does not figure in either NOA or the Galilean 
strategy, and consequently the ontological and methodological commitments mentioned 
above remain invariant under any reading of representation, and should be acceptable to 
realists and antirealists alike – with due provisos mentioned regarding Van Fraassen’s 
constructive empiricism.  
 
However, the term representation does play a prominent role in the epistemic 
commitment mentioned above, NEA, as shown in section 3. And as it turns out this 
commitment is far from invariant under a change of conception of representation 
(sections 6 and 7); on the contrary, in moving from a realist-leaning to a deflationary 
conception there is a subtle and important change in NEA. Although there are versions 
of NEA compatible with both deflationary and substantive reductive conceptions of 
representation, they differ greatly in some important respects. In particular the 
differences affect the main argument advanced by Kitcher in favour of real realism. For 
while the deflationary version of NEA satisfies the requirement that takes NEA to 
emerge directly from practice, thus keeping neutral between realism and antirealism, it 
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does not yield real realism. By contrast, the substantive reductive version of NEA yields 
real realism in conjunction with the other two commitments, but it fails to be grounded 
directly upon practice and is thus not neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, 
incorporating elements that are decisively biased in favour of realism. 
 
Hence I hope to have shown that Kitcher’s argument does not in fact provide reasons 
for realism, but instead points towards a sort of quietism with respect to the realism-
antirealism debate on the nature of science. For only by assuming realism itself can we 
make the argument do work in favour of realism. The view that results from a neutral 
standpoint on representation is what I call the bare view, which provides no grounds to 
assert that science aims at truth, nor that it aims at empirical adequacy, nor any other 
aim. Note that it does not follow that particular scientific inquiries have no aims. As 
Arthur Fine once ably put it (Fine, 1984) all scientific endeavours have aims – some of 
them might be aimed at truth, some at empirical adequacy, some others yet at something 
else. But to reason from “all scientific endeavours have aims” to “there is an aim that all 
scientific endeavours have” is to incur in a familiar sort of logical fallacy in the order of 
the quantifiers. 
 
This is a fallacy that the bare view does not commit, since on this view the activity of 
surrogate inference-drawing is at the heart of all scientific inquiry, but there is no 
particular aim that all inference-drawing is directed towards. The bare view is thus 
compatible with any endeavour’s aims. Hence, despite Kitcher’s best efforts, the 
realism-antirealism issue is not settled, and the debate lives on. This debate is fruitful 
only when we stick as closely as possible to the details of each and every scientific case, 
making no particular assumptions about the nature of science as a whole. For each case, 
the question is open whether instrumentalism or realism is the best interpretation. We 
can say that all scientific inquiries engage in the activity of surrogate reasoning, but we 
can not go on to fruitfully make further assumptions regarding the essential aims that all 
different instances of surrogate reasoning in science might have in common. That 
debate – about the essential aims of science – is not to be settled. 
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